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CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND 
COUNTRY RISK RATINGS: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. 
FINANCIALS 
Halil Kiymaz, Rollins College 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study reports how country risk and macroeconomic conditions influence the wealth gains of U.S. 
financial firms involved in international mergers and takeovers. The findings suggest that U.S. financials 
experience weakly significant wealth gains around announcement date. The wealth gains are significant for 
takeovers in Latin America. There are also differences in wealth gains of subsector affiliations of financial 
firms. While banks experiencing wealth loss, both insurance and investment services firms having significant 
wealth gains. The country risk, including economic, political, and financial risk ratings, help to explain the 
wealth gains to financial bidders.  
 
JEL : G14, G15, G20, G34 
 
KEYWORDS: Financial Takeovers, Country Risk, Wealth Effects 
   
INTRODUCTION 
 
nternational mergers and takeovers continue to get attention of both academicians and practitioners. The 
financial services industry also has experienced an extensive period of reorganization and consolidation 
with increased trend toward cross-border takeovers. The motivations for these include existence of 
economic reasons for restructuring, an increase in the general economic integration and volume of trade 
across national borders, changes in laws, and presence of an easy financing environment. The international 
involvements of firms both provide new opportunities for the firms and expose them variety of risks, 
including economic, political, and financial risks, among others. The argument for in favor of cross-border 
takeovers includes firm’s ability to realize benefits that can’t be obtained cross-country portfolio 
diversification. Therefore, cross-border takeovers may add value to shareholders wealth.  
 
Majority of the studies report positive wealth gains for U.S. firms in international takeovers (Cakici, Hessel, 
and Tandon, 1996; Kiymaz and Mukherjee, 2000; Kiymaz, 2005). There are also studies reporting negative 
wealth gains to U.S. acquiring firms. For example, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find that firms 
involving cross-border takeovers experience lower wealth gains than domestic takeovers. Doukas and Kan 
(2006) report that foreign involvement decreases shareholder value while increasing bondholder value.  
 
This study researches the impact of country risk (political, economic, and financial risks) on the stock price 
reactions of US financial firms announcing foreign takeovers. The study first examines the wealth effects that 
result from takeover announcements for US financials involved in cross-border takeovers during the period of 
1989-2003. It then explores the impact of geographical location of target and the industry affiliation of bidder 
on wealth gains. The study further examines the determinants of wealth gains to U.S. bidder by analyzing 
country risk and macroeconomic factors while controlling for other variables. 
 
Overall, findings show the stock prices of U.S. financials increase slightly following takeover 
announcements. These results are contrary to those of domestic studies of financial mergers that report 
declining stock prices following takeovers announcements. The extent of stock price change also varies 
depending on location of target and sub-sector of financial bidders.  
I 
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Cross-sectional regression results show that country risk play a role in explaining the stock price reaction. 
The wealth gains (increase in stock prices) relate positively with economic risk rating and inversely with 
financial and political risk rating. This implies that takeovers in more stable economic environment lead 
higher wealth gains to U.S. financials. On the other hand, the inverse relation between wealth gains and 
financial and political risk ratings suggest that takeover in countries with lower financial and political risk 
rating (higher risk) result in higher wealth gains to bidders. This may be a result of bidding firms negotiating 
a better deal as less favorable financial or political conditions present opportunity for U.S. bidders to pay 
lower premiums to target. Further, there would not be many firms willing to invest in a country with 
declining financial prospect.  Macroeconomic control variables also support these findings. For example, 
wealth gains relate negatively to foreign economic condition variable which measures the relative economic 
outlook of a local economy. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The question of whether stockholders reward firms that increase their foreign involvement continues to be a 
focus of attention in finance literature. The empirical evidence is inconclusive and unable to show that firm’s 
multinational presence increases its value. Studies of domestic takeovers report wealth loss to acquiring 
institutions. For example, Houston and Ryngaert (1994) show that while bidders suffer a loss, targets 
experience wealth gains. Madura and Wiant (1994) find that bidders suffer an abnormal negative return, 
which may be a result of the high offer price. Frames and Lastrapes (1998) report that bidders, on average, 
experience negative abnormal returns and target firms experience positive abnormal returns. In general, 
existing studies on domestic mergers of financial institutions report statistically significant wealth gains (9% 
on average) to targets and wealth loss (-3 % on average) to bidders. 
 
Among studies researching the wealth gains of financial institutions in an international setting, Waheed and 
Mathur (1995) find that U.S. banks experience significant wealth changes when announcing to engage in 
foreign expansion, more notable in expansion into developing countries. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
document that returns to both the targets and bidders to European financials are positive, a result that is 
contrary to the wealth effects’ results found for U.S. bank mergers. Kiymaz (2005) examines U.S. bidders 
and targets involved in cross-border mergers of financial institutions and report differences in wealth gains 
with industry classification and to the regional location of foreign targets and bidders.  
 
Apart from the changes in stock prices because of takeover announcement, international involvements of 
firms also expose them to variety of risks. The total risks acquiring firms face include economic, political, 
and financial risks. Knowing how these risks impact wealth gains would help acquiring firms to find out 
premiums offered to their targets. While various sources of risk measures available (that is Economist 
Intelligence Unit and Euromoney), this study uses the risk measures of International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). ICRG reports five financial, twelve political, and five economic risk factors for each country.  While 
some of these risks can be managed individually through insurance, hedging and other types of financial 
planning, many of them cannot be controlled with such instruments. Some of these risks needs to be taken 
into account in firm’s expected return from its investments and hence it can require higher return from 
countries with riskier outlook. There are numerous studies looking at the risk factors and overseas investment 
of multinationals. These studies tend to use accounting measures of returns over certain time period. Among 
them, Click (2005) examines the risk of US direct foreign investment by suing the return on investment as a 
measure of return on capital. Erb, Campbell, and Viskanta (1996) suggest that country risk measures are 
correlated with the future equity returns and valuation measures. Diamonte, Liew, and Stevens (1996) show 
that changes in political risk have bigger impact on emerging market returns. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) 
report that the differences in corruption level of home and host country play an important role on foreign 
direct investment. This paper contributes to the literature by examining the wealth gains from cross-border 
acquisitions of U.S. financials and impact of country risk factors in explaining these gains.  
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample Selection and Characteristics 
 
Panel A of Table 1 outlines the sample selection. The initial sample includes the financial acquisitions by 
U.S. firms reported in various Merger and Acquisitions Journal issues during the period of 1989-2003.  We 
apply the following screening criteria: First, we limit sample to firms with stock price data available on the 
CRSP database. Second, the announcement date must be obtainable in The Wall Street Journal. Third, there 
must be no contaminating corporate announcements within five business days before and after the event day. 
The final usable sample consists of 250 foreign acquisitions by U.S. financial bidders. 
 
Table 1: Sample Selection and Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Sample selection  
 U.S. bidders 
M&As initial sample    
Less: No news    
Less: No data on CRSP    
Less: Missing data on CRSP     
Net sample    
Panel B: Frequency of sample by region 
 
  
Regions # of takeovers % of takeovers 
   Europe 138 55% 
   Asia/Pacific 31 12% 
   North America 35 14% 
   Latin America 35 14% 
   Others 11   5% 
Total 250 100% 
Panel C: Frequency of sample by subsector classification   
Subsector classification # of takeovers  % of takeovers 
SIC60-61 Depository/Non-Depository Institutions  63 25% 
SIC62 Security/Commodity Broker/Dealers  38 15% 
SIC63-64 Insurance 106 42% 
SIC67 Investment and Financial Services  43 18% 
Total 250 100% 
This table shows sample characteristics. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of the sample by location of foreign target. Europe ranks first with 
138 (55%) takeovers followed by 35 (14%) takeovers in North America and Latin America each. Panels C of 
Table 1 outlines the sample distribution based on industry classification. The most frequent U.S. financial 
acquisitions (106) occurred in the insurance (SIC63-64) followed by depository/non-depository institutions 
(SIC60-61) with (63) takeovers. Investment and financial services (SIC67) is in third place with (43) 
takeovers followed by security/commodity brokers/dealers with (38) takeovers. 
 
The stock price data is obtained from the CRSP daily return database. The data on macroeconomic variables 
are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS). The financial statements of firms are gathered from 
Compustat. Country risk ratings are from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
 
Methodology 
 
Standard event study method is used to measure the impact of takeover announcements on acquiring firms’ 
stock prices. The following single-market model is employed in parameter estimation: 
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Where: 
 Ri,t = the rate of return on security i on day t,  
 RD,t = the rate of return on the market value weighted CRSP Index, 
 βi,D = the slope of the regression line of the firm i's returns against the returns on the 
market value CRSP Index, 
 αi = the intercept term, 
 εi,t = the residuals. 
 
An abnormal return (wealth effect) for common stock of firm i on day t is defined as: 
Where,  
in which αi, and βi,D, are estimated market model parameters obtained by using the pre-estimation period (t 
= - 316 to t = - 61).  The expected value of abnormal returns and average abnormal returns is zero in the 
absence of abnormal performance. We use Brown and Warner (1985) for the test of significance. 
  
Determinants of Wealth Effects 
  
A number of studies have also examined the factors influencing wealth gains in the context of international 
mergers (e.g., Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Cakici, Hessel, and Tandon, 1996; 
and Kiymaz and Mukherjee, 2000; Kiymaz, 2005, 2009). The factors cited as indication of higher wealth 
gains to participants include relatively stronger currency, previous corporate involvement in the foreign 
country, and a lower GNP growth correlation of the countries involved, among others. 
 
This study focuses on country risk ratings (political, financial, and economic), macroeconomic variables 
(economic conditions and exchange rates), and geographical and industry affiliation variables to explain the 
wealth gains to U.S. financial bidders.  
  
Country Risk Rating 
 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating includes 22 variables in three subcategories of 
political, financial and economic risk ratings. ICRG collects political information and financial and 
economic data, converting these into risk points for each individual risk component from a consistent 
pattern of evaluation. While the political risk assessments are made based on subjective analysis of 
available information, the economic and financial risk assessments use objective data. The political risk 
ratings include government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, 
external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, 
democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality. The economic risk ratings consider GDP per capita, 
real GDP growth, annual inflation, budget balance, and current account as a percentage of GDP. Finally, 
financial risk ratings consider foreign debt as percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as percentage of 
exports of goods and services, current account as a percentage of export, net international liquidity, and 
exchange rate stability. The political risk assessment is based on subjective staff analysis of available 
information. Economic risk factors are based on objective analysis of quantitative data, and financial risk 
  + R .  +  = R ti,tD,Di,iti, εβα        (1) 
   R - R = AR ti,ti,ti, ˆ        (2) 
 R .  +  = R tD,Di,iti, βα ˆˆˆ        (3)
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scores are based on analysis of a mix of quantitative and qualitative information.  
 
Geographic Variables 
 
Various studies (Doukas and Lang, 2003 and Hughes and Mester, 1998) suggest that geographically 
diversified firms improve the risk-return trade-off. Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell (2000) also argue 
that cross-border consolidations are likely to improve the risk-expected return trade-off of bidder and target. 
Kiymaz (2004) also reports that U.S. acquisitions in Latin American countries experience higher wealth 
gains.  
 
To explore the impact of geographical diversification on wealth gains of U.S. bidders, we use a set of dummy 
variables, representing target firm’s geographical location. EUROPE is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if target firm is in Europe, and zero otherwise. We construct ASIA/PACIFIC, N. AMERICA, LATIN 
AMERICA and OTHERS variables similarly. 
 
Subsector Classification Variables 
 
To find out the impact of sub-industry affiliation on wealth gains, we further develop a set of dummy 
variables representing various industry groups in the sample. Differing levels of efficiency and expertise in 
each industry and divergent capacities to exploit opportunities may help explain wealth effects. For example, 
Doukas and Travlos (1988) report that wealth gains are greater when firms diversify across industries. We 
compose these group of variables based the SIC codes of U.S. financials. SIC60-61 is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the industry classification is depository/non-depository institutions, and zero otherwise. 
Similarly, SIC62, SIC63-64, and SIC67 show security/commodity brokers/dealers, insurance, and investment 
and financial services sub-sectors.  
 
Other Variables 
  
Some macroeconomic control variables are taken into account. Saturation of firm’s home market is an 
important element for its international expansion. If the home market is maturing, a firm has an economic 
incentive to seek new opportunities. The countries with favorable economic conditions (for example, 
expanding economies) are more likely to be an expansion spot. Vennet (1996) argues that an acquisition of a 
foothold presence for potential growth in foreign markets is a major reason for international takeovers. To 
measure the impact of economic conditions, we compose the following variables:   
 
First, to estimate the foreign economic condition in the host country, we construct (FORECO) variable 
following Kiymaz (2005). We describe this variable as the target country’s GNP growth in the year prior 
to the announcement of the merger minus the average GNP growth rate of the target country during the 
study period, divided by the average GNP growth rate of the target country during the study period. This 
variable may be directly or inversely related to the wealth gains of U.S. bidders. If U.S. financials expect 
to gain market share and increase cash flow, then the impact would be positive. On the other hand, 
favorable economic conditions in the host market may force bidders to pay higher premiums to targets. 
U.S. financial bidders may become over-optimistic about the potential benefits and pay higher premiums 
to acquire the foreign targets. Overpayment for an takeover will translate into negative wealth gains to 
bidders. For example, Madura and Wiant (1994) conclude that negative abnormal returns to a bidder may 
be a result of offering a higher price to acquire the target. 
 
Second, we use a dummy variable to capture economic development of target country. Waheed and Mathur 
(1995) report that expansion into developing countries yields higher wealth gains to the bidder. By using the 
IMF’s classification, we divide target countries in two groups: advanced economy countries and developing 
economy countries. DEV is equal to one if the target country is a developing economy and zero if it is an 
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advanced country. As multinational firms can capitalize their expertise in developing economies to generate 
revenues and cash flows because of having less intense competition, we expect higher wealth gains when the 
destination country is a developing country.  
 
GNPCORR variable is formed by following Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000). This variable is defined as 
the correlation between the annual growth rates in GNPs of the two countries over a twelve-year period 
ending in the year before the merger. Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000) argue the degree of divergence 
affects the extent to which the economies of two countries move together (that is the greater the 
differences, the lesser the co-movements). The purpose of this measure is to capture the difference 
between the business cycles in the countries of merging firms.  
 
We also consider two exchange rate related variables. First, the relative strength or weakness of the 
domestic versus the foreign currency can influence the premiums paid in a merger. Currency strength can 
affect the takeover cost of the target firm, the choice of financing, and the value of the repatriated profits to 
the bidder. Vasconcellos, Madura, and Kish (1990) and Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) report that when the 
bidder's currency is strong relative to the target’s currency, the target's shareholders receive greater wealth 
gains. We construct FXRATE variable as a two-step procedure used by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991): the 
exchange rate of the foreign currency (in terms of U.S. dollars) in the year of announcement is subtracted 
from the average exchange rate of the foreign currency during the study period. The difference is then divided 
by the average exchange rate. A positive (negative) value suggests the foreign currency is stronger (weaker) 
relative to the U.S. dollar.  
 
The impact of strength of home currency on bidders is unclear because the expected future cash flows is a 
function of future exchange rates. Bidders are better off with stronger home currency during takeovers and a 
weaker home currency during repatriation of dividends and cash flows. Vasconcellos and Kish (1993) argue 
exchange rate effect is not clear and it is an empirical issue. 
 
A variation of taking the impact of the exchange rate on wealth gains is to look at the volatility of exchange 
rates. The higher the volatility of exchange rate, the higher the uncertainty about the value of repatriated 
earnings to the parent company. Therefore the lower the wealth gains to bidders and targets. We frame 
FXVOL variable as the standard deviation of monthly exchange rates during the year of merger, expecting 
vary inversely with the wealth gains to bidders.      
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Wealth Effects  
 
The impact of takeover announcement on financial firms is estimated by using the market model. Panel A 
of Table 2 reports the preliminary results for daily abnormal returns surrounding the merger 
announcement. The average abnormal returns (AARs) for U.S. financials are 0.17% on the day of merger 
announcement and statistically weakly significant at 10% level. Panel B of Table 2 reports five different 
cumulative abnormal return (CARs) for many windows. For the (-1,0) and (-1,+1) windows, the CARs 
are 0.18% and 0.29% respectively, only the latter one is statistically significant at 10% level. These 
findings show the merger announcements affect stock prices positively but the impact is not strong.  
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Table 2:  Abnormal Returns to U.S. Financial Bidders during Announcements of Takeovers 
 
Panel A: Average Daily Abnormal Returns (AARs) (%) 
U.S. financial bidders (n=250) 
Days AARs  (%) t-value Positive: Negative Generalized Sign Test 
-10 0.22 1.49 126:124 0.61 
-9 -0.06 -0.69 114:136 -0.59 
-8 -2.58 1.80* 119:131 0.48 
-7 -0.10 -0.77 121:129 -0.06 
-6 -0.02 0.14 115:135 -0.59 
-5 0.09 0.06 120:130 -0.06 
-4 0.05 0.27 118:132 -0.46 
-3 0.20 1.54 121:129 -0.19 
-2 0.05 0.17 116:134 -0.72 
-1 0.17 1.67* 120:130 0.34 
0 0.01 0.47 125:125 1.01 
+1 0.11 1.09 123:127 0.61 
+2 -0.06 -0.29 126:124 1.27 
+3 -0.33 -2.29** 105:145 -1.39 
+4 0.15 1.60 127:123 1.41 
+5 -0.08 -0.44 121:129 0.48 
+6 -0.15 -1.10 112:138 -0.59 
+7 0.05 -0.02 121:129 0.34 
+8 0.20 1.39 130:120 0.88 
+9 -0.18 -1.78* 123:127 -0.06 
+10 0.02 0.30 132:118 1.88* 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
U.S. financial bidders (n=250) 
Windows CARs 
(%) 
t-value Positive: Negative Generalized Sign test 
(-1,0) 0.18 1.51 124:126 0.98 
(-1,+1) 0.29 1.74* 126:124 0.96 
(-5,+5) 0.36 1.57 127:123 0.89 
(-10,+10) 0.53 1.06 131:119 1.08 
(-10, -2) 0.62 1.88* 123:127 1.45 
(+1, +6) -0.36 -1.50 118:132 -1.51 
This table shows abnormal returns to U.S. financial bidder.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the CARs for U.S. bidders in six different windows for the location of the foreign 
target. U.S. financials acquiring firms in Latin America experience positive abnormal returns consistently. 
For example, the CARs for windows (-1,0), and (-1,+1) are 0.90% and  1.71% respectively. Both are 
statistically significant. Acquisitions in other regions (Asia/Pacific, Europe, North America and Others) yield 
insignificant positive/negative wealth gains. These findings support the view that there are differences in 
wealth gains with respect to the location of target firms. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 outlines the detailed analysis of wealth gains to U.S. financial bidders using sub-sector 
affiliation. We note differences in wealth gains based on the sub-industrial affiliation as well. While U.S. 
financials operating in SIC63-64 and SIC67 groups experience statistically significant wealth gains in their 
cross-border acquisitions, firms operating in SIC60-61 group have mostly significant losses in many of the 
event windows under consideration. For example, SIC67 has CARs of 1.11% and 1.54% in (-1,0) and (-1,+1) 
event windows, both being statistically significant at 10% and 1% levels respectively. SIC60-61, on the other 
hand, has negative wealth gains of -2.11% on (-5,+5) event window that is significant in. It appears that while 
some subsectors experience wealth gains, others have wealth losses during the announcement of U.S. 
financials’ international acquisitions.   
 
Overall, U.S. financial bidders experience positive wealth gains that vary with the location of the targets. 
Wealth gains are statistically significant in takeovers in Latin America but either positive insignificant or 
negative for acquisitions in Asia/Pacific, Europe, and N. America. Negative wealth gains from N. 
American (mostly Canadian) targets may be a result of having similar economic and cultural environment 
in Canada, hence the lack of regional diversification benefits.  With respect to industry classification, 
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bidders operating in SIC63-64 and SIC67 experience statistically significant positive wealth gains.  
Table 3 Abnormal Returns to US Financial Bidders—Location of Target and Industry Affiliation of Bidders 
 
Panel A: Location of Targets   
 Locations of foreign targets 
Windows Europe 
N=138 
Asia/Pacific 
n=31 
N. America 
n=35 
Latin America 
n=35 
Other Locations 
n=11 
(-1,0) 
 
0.27 
(1.43) 
0.48 
(0.98) 
-0.87 
(-0.96) 
0.90 
(2.09**) 
-0.61 
(-0.59) 
(-1,+1) 
 
0.09 
(0.45) 
0.60 
(0.99) 
-0.79 
(-1.02) 
1.71 
(2.98**) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
(-5,+5) 
 
0.54 
(1.04) 
-0.03 
(-0.10) 
-1.23 
(-1.09) 
1.83 
(1.70*) 
2.54 
(1.43) 
(-10,+10) 
 
0.89 
(1.39) 
-1.34 
(-0.78) 
-0.89 
(-0.77) 
0.81 
(1.44) 
4.75 
(1.88*) 
(-10, -2) 
 
0.71 
(1.21) 
-0.10 
(-.02) 
-0.59 
(-0.49) 
2.01 
(1.81*) 
4.01 
(1.79*) 
(+1,+6) 
 
0.26 
(0.67) 
-1.26 
(-1.37) 
-0.87 
(-0.73) 
1.54 
(1.60) 
-0.07 
(-0.03) 
Panel B: Sub-sector Affiliation 
 Sub-sector affiliations of financial bidders 
Windows SIC60-61 
n=63 
SIC62 
n=38 
SIC63-64 
n=106 
SIC67 
n=43 
(-1, 0) -0.79 
(-1.58) 
0.32 
(0.62) 
0.34 
(1.03) 
1.11 
(2.21**) 
(-1, 1) -0.68 
(-0.89) 
-0.18 
(-0.29) 
0.43 
(1.57) 
1.54 
(2.89***) 
(-5, 5) -2.11 
(-2.28**) 
-0.40 
(-0.29) 
1.69 
(2.88***) 
1.62 
(2.01**) 
(-10, 10) -2.90 
(-2.78***) 
1.50 
(1.33) 
1.92 
(3.11***) 
1.51 
(1.89*) 
(-10, 2) -2.05 
(-2.10**) 
0.58 
(0.43) 
2.01 
(3.25***) 
2.14 
(1.78*) 
(1, 6) -1.86 
(-2.22**) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.25 
(0.89) 
1.63 
(1.71*) 
This table shows abnormal returns to US financial bidders based on the target and industry affiliation of bidders.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Factors Influencing Wealth Effects 
 
The following equation was estimated to identify the determinants of wealth gains (CAR) to bidders. 
 
CAR= β0+β1EconRisk+β2FinRisk+β3PoliRiskK+β4Europe+β5AsiaPacific+ β6N.America 
+β7LatinA+β8Others+β9SIC6061+β10SIC62+β11SIC6364+β12SIC67+β13Foreco+ β14Develop 
+β15GNPCorr+β16FXRate+β17FXVol+ ε                                                    (4) 
       
Table 5 contains regression results for five separate equations. Correlation among explanatory variables 
indicates that multi-collinearity is not a problem to influence interpretation of the results. To control for 
heteroskedasticity problem, we normalize variables by the standard errors of the market model (Kiymaz 
2005). 
 
Each equation adds a new group of independent variables into the analysis. The first equation in each table 
uses country risk variables to explain wealth effects. The second equation contains country risk variables 
along with geographic variables, the third equation includes country risk and industry classification variables. 
Fourth equation has both country risk and other variables. Finally, the fifth equation put together all variables.   
 
The adjusted R2 for all regressions ranges from 0.072 to 0.429. The impact of country risk in explaining 
the wealth gains to U.S. financials is clear as those variables mostly continue to be significant as we 
control for other factors. ECONRISK, FINRISK, and POLIRISK are statistically significant across each 
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set of equation. For example, ECONRISK has a coefficient of 0.0119 in the first equation, suggesting a 
higher wealth gains for the bidders involved acquisitions in low economic risk environment such as low 
annual inflation, low budget deficit as a percentage of GDP. This would show that a 10% increase in 
economic risk rating of county would translate a 12% increase in wealth gains to acquiring firms.  
 
On the other hand, the inverse relation between wealth gains and financial and political risk ratings 
suggest that acquisition in countries with higher financial and political risk rating (higher risk) result in 
lower wealth gains to bidders. This may be result of bidding firms negotiating a better deal as bad 
financial/political conditions present opportunity for U.S. financials to pay lower premiums to target. 
Market does not seem to be punishing the investments in less stable countries with more internal/external  
 
Table 5: Cross-sectional Regression Results for U.S. Financial Bidders 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
Constant 
 
0.0238 
(0.17) 
-0.5718 
(-3.77)** 
0.0504 
(0.39) 
-0.0273 
(-0.17) 
-0.4208 
(-2.76)*** 
Country Risk Variables  
ECON 
 
0.0119 
(3.56)*** 
0.0060 
(1.79*) 
0.0140 
(4.37)*** 
0.0033 
(0.90) 
0.0067 
(2.02)** 
FIN 
 
-0.0044 
(-2.25)** 
-0.0030 
(-1.46) 
-0.0064 
(-3.25)*** 
-0.0053 
(-2.45)** 
-0.0017 
(-0.78) 
POLITICAL 
 
-0.0031 
(-1.87)* 
-0.0028 
(-1.49) 
-0.0035 
(-2.25)** 
-0.0026 
(-1.28) 
-0.0032 
(-1.71)* 
Geographic Variables  
EUROPE 
 - -0.0019 (-0.06) - - 
0.0124 
(0.47) 
ASIA/PACIFIC 
 - - - - 
- 
 
N. AMERICA 
 - 
-0.0351 
(-1.08) - - 
-0.0105 
(-0.34) 
LATINA - 0.1929 (5.91)*** - - 
0.1057 
(3.27)*** 
OTHERS 
  
0.0183 
(0.38) - - 
-0.0019 
(-0.04) 
Sub-sector Classification Variables  
SIC60-61 
 - - 
-0.0804 
(-2.92)*** - 
-0.1032 
(-4.32)*** 
SIC62 
 - - - - 
- 
 
SIC63-64 
 - - 
0.0156 
(0.62) - 
0.0059 
(0.28) 
SIC67 
 - - 
0.1226 
(4.72)*** - 
0.0547 
(2.28)** 
Other Variables  
FORECO - - - -0.075 (-3.98)*** 
-0.0488 
(-3.12)*** 
DEVELOP - - - 0.0626 (2.68)** 
0.0377 
(1.96)* 
GNPCORR - - - -0.1320 (-3.71)*** 
-0.0566 
(-1.75)* 
FXRATE -  - - 
-0.0171 
(-0.27) 
-0.0008 
(-0.02) 
 
FXVOL - - - 
-0.0125 
(-2.47)** 
-0.0069 
(-1.67)* 
      
Adj. R2 0.0724 0.251 0.313 0.250 0.429 
F-stat 6.40*** 12.96*** 19.95*** 11.37*** 12.70*** 
This table shows cross sectional results for U.S. financial bidders.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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conflict, more corruption, and lower disclosure and accountability. Similarly financial risk variable is 
inversely related to wealth gains to U.S. financial bidders. Markets may view investments in countries 
with high opportunities.  
 
The second equation in Table 5 adds geographic dummy variables into the analysis. To avoid dummy 
variable trap, Asia/Pacific variable is chosen as a control group. The coefficient of LATINA is 0.1929 and 
significant while the coefficients of remaining groups (EUROPE and NAMERICA) are negative and 
insignificant. Findings suggest that takeovers in LATINA region yield significantly higher wealth gains to 
U.S. financials relative to control group (i.e. ASIA/PACIFIC). There is no evidence of statistical 
difference between the remaining groups (EUROPE, NAMERICA, and OTHERS) and control group. 
Cakici, Hessel, and Tandon (1996) and Kiymaz (2005) also report similar findings. 
 
We add industry classification dummy variables into analysis in the fourth equation. Here SIC62 
(Securities/Commodity Brokers/Dealers) group is chosen as the control group. We interpret the findings 
for the remaining sub-industry groups relative to the control group. For example, SIC67 has a coefficient 
of 0.1226 and statistically significant at the 1% level, showing that acquisitions by U.S. investment and 
financial services firms (SIC67) yield higher wealth gains relative to the acquisitions by firms SIC62 
group. On the other hand, SIC60-61 (Depository/Non-depository institutions) has a statistically 
significant coefficient of -0.0.0804, suggesting that institutions in this group (SIC60-61) experience lower 
wealth gains compared to firms in SIC62 group.  
 
The fourth equation adds the other control variables to country risk variables in explaining wealth gains. 
The financial risk variable continues to be significant. Four of the macroeconomic control variables are 
statistically significant. These are FORECO, DEV, GNPCORR, and FXVOL variables. For example, 
DEV has a coefficient of 0.0626 and is directly related to the wealth gains to U.S. financial bidders. It has 
the hypothesized positive sign indicating that acquisition in developing countries yields greater wealth 
gains for U.S. financial bidders. This finding is in line with Waheed and Mathur (1995) who report that 
expansion into developing countries yields higher wealth gains to bidders. GNPCORR variable has 
negative sign indicating that the wealth gains are higher when countries have varying business cycles. 
Kiymaz (2000) also report similar results. 
 
FORECO has negative sign implying an inverse relation between wealth gains to bidder and foreign 
economic condition. We interpret this finding as U.S. bidders paying higher premium to the targets when 
economic conditions are more favorable. Alternatively this may imply bidder overpaying to target 
because of optimistic potential of takeover. Madura and Wiant (1994) argue the negative return to the 
bidder may be a result of higher offer price to target. The last significant variable is FXVOL that has a 
coefficient of -0.0125, suggesting the higher volatility of exchange rate, the higher the uncertainty about the 
value of future cash flows and therefore the lower the wealth gains to bidders. The remaining 
macroeconomic variable, FXRATE, does not appear to have any significant impact on wealth gains in 
this study.  
 
The final equation includes country risk factor, geographic, industry classification, and other 
macroeconomic control variables. Two of the country risk variables along with the macroeconomic 
control variables continue to be statistically significant after controlling the location of target firms and 
industrial affiliation of bidders.  
 
Generally, the results of the cross-sectional regressions demonstrate that the country risk factors and some of 
the control variables play significant roles in explaining wealth gains to bidders. For example, the 
ECONRISK, FINRISK and POLIRISK are mostly significant for U.S. financials. While ECONRISK is 
directly related to wealth gains, FINRISK and POLIRISK are inversely related to wealth gains, suggesting 
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the higher the economic risk rating (lower risk) results in higher wealth gains to U.S. bidder.  Takeover in 
financially and politically less stable environment may be viewed because of bidders becoming 
overoptimistic about the potential and overpaying the targets. Among the geographic variables, the 
acquisitions in Latin American region clearly yield the highest returns. The findings of this study suggest the 
cross-border merger slightly benefit bidders. This may imply that consolidation in the cross-border arena may 
continue in the future. Favorable economic conditions in target and bidder’s country are likely to increase 
cross-border merger activities. Finding varying wealth gains in different regions may imply that certain 
regulation by economic unions to protect domestic industries makes it difficult or costly for foreign bidders to 
enter these markets and limit the global consolidation internationally.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the impact of mergers and acquisitions on U.S. financials involved in cross-border 
takeovers. The sample consists of 250 cross-border takeovers by U.S. financials. The findings show that these 
firms experience weakly statistically significant wealth gains on the announcement day. Further analysis of 
geographical location of foreign targets, suggests there are differences in wealth gains with respect to the 
location of the foreign target. U.S. financial bidders only experience significant wealth gains in their 
acquisitions of targets located in Latin America.  Similarly there are differences in wealth gains in sub-sectors 
of financials. For example, U.S. financials in SIC67, SIC63-64 experience higher wealth gains than others. 
 
The regression results show the country risk factors are important in explaining the wealth gains to U.S. 
financial bidders. There are direct relationships between wealth gains to U.S. bidders and the economic risk 
rating and inverse relations between wealth gains to U.S. bidders and financial and political risk ratings. Also, 
economic development of target, correlation in GNP growth, economic outlook in the host market, and 
exchange rate volatility relate significantly to the gains to U.S. bidders.  
 
The study period covers one of the merger cycles. Merger studies tend be time dependent. It would be 
interesting see how these results would hold for other merger cycles. Further, this paper focuses on financials 
and takeovers in developed markets. Future studies may focus on other sectors and emerging markets. 
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